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A major stylized fact in North-South interindustry trade is the specialization of 
developing economies in “light” manufactures and of developed economies in “heavy” 
manufactures. Recently attention has been drawn to a similar pattern in the intranational 
distribution of economic activity, specifically between urban and rural areas. That is, 
industries based in the countryside have been observed to supply light consumer goods 
such as apparel, handicraft, and footwear to urban centers, either for domestic 
consumption or for export.  
Such a general pattern for interregional trade (where region denotes either a 
country or a subnational area) begs for an explanation within a unified model. A coherent 
framework that explains this stylized fact, aside from its intrinsic academic interest, can 
be useful for informing industrial promotion policies on light and heavy industries, in 
both urban and rural areas.  
The typical explanation for the pattern relies on Hecksher-Ohlin theory: light 
industries are labor intensive activities, which would tend to be exported by regions 
which are relatively labor abundant, i.e. developing economies and rural areas. According 
to this theory, specialization is attributed entirely to factor proportions; the relative 
magnitude of scale economies in light and heavy goods is irrelevant, as what really 
matters is their relative factor intensities. Industries are in fact assumed to be subject to 
constant returns to scale.   
The Hecksher-Ohlin model is appealing because the simple analytics of its 
general equilibrium solution. However it is well known that the basic Hecksher-Ohlin 
proposition is not empirically tenable. In line with recent trade research, this paper  
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confronts the possibility that fundamentals other than factor proportions may be at work 
in determining the pattern of interindustry trade.  
A natural way to distinguish light from heavy industry is by differences in scale 
economies (rather than by differences in factor intensity.) Meanwhile regions may be 
ranked not by factor proportions, but by size of domestic demand, as proxied by market 
size. Relating market size to the size of scale of economies adopted at equilibrium would 
therefore be an alternative approach to explaining the stylized fact.  
Scale economies animate the “new trade theory”. However the new approach is 
most directly applicable to the analysis of intraindustry trade. As for interindustry trade,  
one variation in the increasing returns literature is to fall back on the factor proportions 
explanation. On the other hand, another variation in the literature offers an alternative 
explanation based on demand. The resulting hypothesis is stated as the home market 
effect:  the region with a larger domestic demand for an increasing returns commodity is 
predicted to be an exporter of that commodity. The effect highlights the role of market 
size, thereby countering some of the empirical difficulties of attributing trade patterns 
purely to factor proportions.  
Within these new generation models however, industries remain caricatured into 
an increasing returns/constant returns dichotomy. A better approximation of reality would 
be a model in which equilibrium is characterized by smaller scale industry exports by 
developing regions, and larger scale industry exports by developed regions. Incorporating 
diversity of scale economies in the standard Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition 
framework has however proven to be an intractable task.   
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In this paper we propose an alternative imperfect competition model that explains 
the stylized fact in terms of scale economies and market size. The significant property of 
this model is that differences in magnitude of scale economies is introduced in an 
intuitive and flexible manner. Instead of the monopolistic competition model, we adopt 
the limit pricing set-up pioneered by Murphy, Schliefer, and Vishny (1989) in their 
analysis of scale economies and the role of market size. We extend their basic framework 
from its original closed economy setting to case of the open economy.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we provide a real world 
setting to the stylization, as well as a review of plausible explanations. The model is then 
presented in Section 3; Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. Interindustry and interregional trade: Patterns and explanations 
  We motivate the discussion here with a broad illustration of the stylized fact 
asserted in the Introduction. This is followed by a quick review of theoretical 
explanations and the corresponding empirical support.  
 
2.1. Patterns of trade   
Assembling systematic evidence on patterns of interindustry trade and scale 
economies is beyond the scope of this paper. A major obstacle to a rigorous presentation 
is that “light” and “heavy” industries are not easily defined in the absence of 
disaggregated production analysis. As an approximation, the category of transport 
equipment and machinery is identified here as heavy industry, while the category of 
textiles and clothing correspond to light industry.   
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At the level of international trade, the following Table provides an illustrative 
comparison of export shares. The selected developing countries in the Table account for 
45% of the world’s population; meanwhile the selected developed countries are the 
world’s top five exporters for 1999. Clearly, heavy industry dominates manufacturing 
exports of the developed economies. In contrast the manufacturing exports of the lowest 
income nations (Pakistan and Bangladesh in particular) in the Table display an 
unmistakable dependence on light industry.  
[INSERT TABLE HERE] 
The higher income developing economies in the table are rely less on textiles and 
garments. For China – the largest developing economy in the listed in the Table – over 
half of manufacturing takes the form of equipment and machinery. The greater 
concentration of heavy goods in Indonesia compared to India (which has a larger GNP) 
may seem to be an anomaly; however, India’s PPP-adjusted per capita income is similar 
to that of Bangladesh and Pakistan, suggesting a large demand for agricultural goods (the 
Engel effect) relative to manufactures, compared to better-off Indonesia and China 
(whose PPP-adjusted per capita incomes are roughly at par.)  
  We turn now to intranational, urban-rural patterns in industry specialization. 
Unfortunately systematic data on urban-rural trade is sparse, as few statistical agencies 
differentiate output by geographic source, particularly in developing countries where the 
rural population shares remain substantial.  
  Instead we simply enumerate the following stylizations culled from various 
literature surveys: First, a large part of manufacturing employment in poor countries is 
rural-based. Going by figures cited in Leidholm and Kilby (1989), rural areas can account  
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for 52% to 86% of total manufacturing employment in these countries. Second, rural-
based manufacturing is typically small scale. As much as 85% of rural industries employ 
fewer than five persons (Leidholm and Mead, 1987). Third, within rural-based 
manufacturing there is a subset of nontraditional activities that cater to external demand. 
This distinction between traditional and modern activities in rural-based industry was 
suggested by Ranis and Stewart (1993).Traditional activities (such as household rice 
milling and hand-loom weaving) conform to the Hymer-Resnick (1969) stereotype of 
primitive rural industries that cater only to local demand. On the other hand, contrary to 
stereotype, there exists a vibrant sector of modern activities (metalworking or machinery 
production) that produce for urban markets, are undertaken in small modern factories, 
and produce high quality products. Such activities would likely be found in rural towns 
rather than in villages.  
  Modern small-scale production is the cutting edge of a dynamic rural nonfarm 
economy, as illustrated in East Asian experience, particularly that of Taiwan and 
mainland China. Reardon (2000) notes that urban-linked but rural-based manufacturing 
(e.g. knitwear, vehicle parts production) is at various stages of development across 
continental areas: it is weakly developed in Africa and South Asia, growing in Latin 
America, and well-advanced in East Asia. It is the presence of this modern rural-based 
“export” sector that makes urban-rural linkages conforms to our stylization in the pattern 
of interregional trade. 
   What could account for these patterns in international and intranational 
specialization? The possible answers can be sorted into four broad categories: 
productivity differences, external economies, factor proportions, and finally, domestic  
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demand. Productivity differences have received relatively little attention in the literature 
given the absence of a general theory of technological change and diversity across 
locations. External economies meanwhile have fallen out of favor given the invisibility of 
spillover effects needed to obtain variations in the degree of industrial concentration. This 
leaves factor proportions and domestic demand as the leading candidates for an 
explanation.  
 
2.2. Empirical evidence  
The factor proportions explanation differentiates regions in terms of relative 
factor endowments, and industries in terms of factor intensity. It predicts that a region 
specializes in the good that uses more intensively the factor it possesses in relative 
abundance. The statement holds under constant returns as in traditional Hecksher-Ohlin 
models, as well as under increasing returns as in standard monopolistic competition 
models, e.g. Dixit and Norman (1980).  
In the case of international trade, the theory is however empirically suspect. In a 
multi-country, multi-factor setting, empirical implementation rests on Hecksher-Ohlin-
Vanek (HOV) proposition: a country’s exports (imports) embody factors which it 
possesses in relative abundance (scarcity). Multicountry studies, initiated by Bowen et. 
al. (1987) and summarized in Helpman (1999), consistently reject the HOV proposition.   
Current empirical work on the issue has tried to assess what modifications need to 
be introduced in order to make HOV theory more consistent with trade data. Trefler 
(1995) finds that an important reason why HOV performs poorly is “missing trade”, i.e. 
the total amount of trade is far lower than what is suggested by factor endowment  
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differences. He finds that a correction taking into account home demand bias greatly 
improves data fit. This leads us to an examination of demand-based explanations of trade.  
We reserve the term “demand-based” for models in which demand factors affect 
industry costs in the presence of economies of scale; The study of demand-based 
explanations of trade is largely undeveloped, despite the longstanding suspicion that scale 
economies combined with market size might be a determinant of trade patterns. 
Deardorff (1984) for one cites work in the 1960s by Drezé and Linder that make the 
connection. More recent formal models hypothesize a home market effect: given trade 
costs and increasing returns, a country will tend to export a good for which it has a 
relatively greater demand. Note that in the absence of scale economies, the home market 
effect will not hold as larger domestic demand for a good simply increases imports.  
Lundback and Torstensson (1998) examine trade patterns of seventeen OECD 
countries and find that demand differences explain more of the net trade pattern than do 
factor proportions; moreover, high domestic demand in an industry leads to a net export 
in the majority of cases, consistent with the home market effect. Their evidence provides 
some but not clear cut support for a demand-based theory of trade. Davis and Weinstein 
(1999) obtain weak evidence for the home market effect in a sample of OECD countries; 
however, reapplying their analysis to Japanese regional data leads to a strong 
confirmation of the home market effect.  
 
2.3. Scale economies and specialization patterns: theory  
  The foregoing suggests that modeling trade in terms of demand and scale 
economies is an empirically promising approach. Nevertheless, conventional theories of  
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scale economies and specialization remain subject to considerable difficulties, which we 
develop more formally in the following.  
The perennial difficulty associated with adopting increasing returns is modeling 
the resulting imperfectly competitive market. The preferred approach is to assume 
monopolistic competition. This market structure requires differentiated products, 
preferences for which are typically modeled in terms of Dixit-Stiglitz utility: 
 
/( 1)






− => ∑ .       ( 1 )  
Here u is the utility function of the representative consumer, qi is the consumption of the 
ith variety, σ   is the constant elasticity of substitution between varieties, and N is the 
number of varieties. Utility rises with the number of product varieties N (assumed large 
enough to approximate a continuous measure.) Production of each qi requires only 
homogenous labor, denoted by li, endowment of which is fixed at L for the economy. 
Technology is subject to increasing returns and takes a linear form assumed to be the 
same for all varieties: 
  ii lf c q =+ .           ( 2 )  
Here f is the fixed start-up cost (in terms of labor) while c is the constant marginal 
product. Setting wage w as fixed from the firm’s viewpoint, then marginal cost is a 
constant function MCi = wc. This is below and asymptotic to the declining average cost 
curve / ii AC fw q wc =+ . Increasing returns therefore implies that each variety is 
produced by only one firm.  
Firms ignore the effect of their actions on other firms. Symmetric equilibrium 
ensures that behavior can be ascribed to a representative firm (hence the subscript may be 
suppressed.) Denoting price by p, firms maximize profit where   
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  (1 ) / MC p σσ =− .          ( 3 )  
With free entry and exit, profits are zero at equilibrium, hence  pA C = . It turns out that 
output is determined solely by the parameters σ , f, and c; the zero profit condition is 
achieved not by adjustments in output, but by adjustments in the number of firms.  
So far the model pertains to a single economy consisting of one differentiated 
industry subject to scale economies. To obtain interindustry trade at least two industries 
and two economies must be present. In nearly all models developed, the other industry is 
assumed to produce a homogenous good under constant returns technology.  
The model developed by Krugman (1980) to obtain the home market effect uses 
the foregoing framework and adds “iceberg” transportation costs of trade. With transport 
cost, a firm has an incentive to locate close to the area in which demand for its product is 
large. Hence, for example, the region with a bigger market (e.g. in this case a larger 
population) will contain a greater proportion of the total manufacturing sector. As 
consumers in both regions purchase all available varieties and goods, then the larger 
regions is a net exporter of the increasing returns industry.   
The model has been extended in several directions. Krugman (1991) incorporates 
factor mobility to show how migration can have the cumulative effect of partial or even 
complete agglomeration of the manufacturing sector in one region. Still on the 
cumulative causation theme, Venables (1995) shows that vertical production linkages is 
another plausible mechanism driving agglomeration at the international level. Both 
vertical linkages and migration were combined in the study by Hanson (1996) of the 
garment industry in Mexico; his models shows how the urban center can specialize in the  
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increasing returns intermediate input, while rural peripheries can specialize in the 
constant returns intermediate input.  
A direction in which the theory should be extended, to better approximate the 
diversity of real world industries, is to accommodate differences in the degree of 
increasing returns. Unfortunately this approach is hardly taken in the literature. Fujita, 
Krugman, and Mori (1999) construct an urban systems model that most closely adopts 
this more general specification. In their model, industries are differentiated by degree of 
scale economies and by transport costs. Population growth leads to the formation of 
“frontier cities” at the fringes of the original urban center. Among the activities  which 
would locate earliest to the frontier would be the smaller scale industries. One may 
interpret these frontier agglomerations as intermediate cities or urbanizing rural towns, 
which export light manufactures to the center in exchange for the heavier manufactures.  
  A major shortcoming of the model is however the adopted measure of scale 
economies, which is the elasticity of substitution σ  in (1). To see why it has been so used, 
express the ratio of average over marginal costs (the elasticity of scale) as  (1 ) σσ − , 
using (3). The problem with this (as with other Dixit-Stiglitz models) is that a parameter 
of taste is applied to characterize technology.  Neary (2001) correctly points out that σ  is 
not really a measure of scale elasticity, but rather of the degree to which returns to scale 
are exploited. A more natural approach to differentiating scale economies would be to use 
the explicit technological parameters, i.e. fi and ci; this tack however quickly leads to a 
loss of tractability.  
To summarize: regional specialization in interindustry trade can be explained by 
factor proportions or by demand-based models, but these explanations remain  
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unsatisfactory. Factor endowments fail to account for a large part of the trade pattern; 
data fit improves by incorporating demand considerations and increasing returns. 
However, within standard increasing returns models, the treatment of diversity of scale 
economies across industries as very limited. Attempts at more flexible characterization of 
scale economies have proved intractable within the dominant monopolistic competition 
framework. 
The model we propose in Section 3 neatly ties up this loose end. However we 
need to depart from the monopolistic competition framework in favor of an even simpler 
formulation based on limit pricing monopoly, pioneered by Murphy, Schliefer, and 
Vishny (1989; henceforth MSV.)  
 
3. The model 
  We present the model in stages. The basic framework is first set up for the case of 
the closed economy. Differentiation of scale economies is then introduced, follow by a 
discussion of the case of trading economies.  
 
3.1. The basic framework for a closed economy 
  The basic framework adopts the original MSV formulation: consider a closed 
region which produces a continuum of goods, the total number of which is a fixed 
measure N. Each good is indexed by i, [0, ] iN ∈ . The representative consumer has 
symmetric Cobb-Douglas utility, such that price elasticity of demand for each good is –1. 
Production uses only labor and takes the linear form of equation (2), rewritten as  
() () () () li fi ciqi =+ . As before labor endowment is fixed at measure L.   
 
12 
There are two alternative technologies for producing each good. The first 
alternative is constant returns production for which fixed labor input is zero and marginal 
cost is 1 under normalized units. This alternative denotes traditional technology, adopted 
by traditional producers. Taken together these producers form the traditional sector, 
which is free of impediments to entry and exit.  
  The other alternative is modern technology, for which  ( ) 0 fi>  and  ( ) 1 ci < . That 
is, modern technology  is subject to increasing returns with positive fixed costs but 
marginal costs less than unity. For each good, only one firm, the modern producer, has 
access to increasing returns production. Taken together these producers constitute the 
modern sector. Within this sector production technology is homogenous, hence 
() fi f = and ( ) ci c = , for all i.  
  Labor is mobile across industries and sectors. All firms seek to maximize profit. 
The model is set in two periods: in period 1, all supply is undertaken by traditional 
producers, and entry decisions are made by modern producers; in period 2, entering 
modern producers commence production. With symmetry, traditional producers act the 
same way; let the output of the traditional sector act as the numeraire with unit price. 
Under constant returns the traditional producers must earn zero profit, and wage must be 
unity. 
  From the viewpoint of the modern producer, the unit price of traditional output 
functions as a limit price; the modern producer may not set a higher price, else she will be 
undercut by the traditional producers. We assume though that the modern producer of 
good i who sets a price of one will be able to monopolize the production of good i. That 
is, she exerts a downward pressure on the price, without discretely reducing it, thus  
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ejecting the traditional producers. Unit elastic demand implies that the modern producer 
has no incentive to set a price discretely below one. Whether production is modern or 
traditional, therefore, output price is one.  
  Under symmetry, equilibrium output is identical across industries; hence we refer 
to a representative industry and suppress the index. There are only two candidate 
outcomes for the output of the representative industry. The first is the traditional 
outcome, in which all industries are produced using traditional technology. The second is 
the modernized outcome, in which all industries are produced using modern technology. 
In either outcome, full employment under symmetry implies:  
  () li l LN == .            ( 4 )  
  In the traditional outcome, profit must be zero; output is simply LN. For the 






= .           ( 5 )  
At the limit price of one, the profit π  of any modern producer is given by  
 (1 ) qcf π =− −         ( 6 )  
For a modern producer to enter, prospective π  must be non-negative. MSV assume the 
modern producer ignores other modern producers’ entry decisions. Using (4) and (6), the 
entry condition is therefore     
  /(1 ) LN f c >−.            ( 7 )  
If (7) satisfied, then equilibrium is the modernized outcome; else, equilibrium is the 
traditional outcome. Condition (7) implies that a sufficiently large labor endowment (and 
therefore market size) relative to the number of goods leads to a modernized outcome.    
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  MSV use this basic framework to analyze the possibility of coordination failure, 
i.e. a situation in which entry by modern producers must be simultaneous (a Big Push) in 
order to reach an equilibrium modernized outcome. They note that if (7) holds, then 
output given by (5) must be profitable, i.e. there is no Big Push. Other assumptions must 
be introduced to obtain coordination failure, i.e. a dual labor market (as in the MSV 
paper), or income elastic demand (Fafchamps and Helms, 1996). Our model though is not 
concerned with the Big Push, but does exploit the fact that, in this framework, market 
size can determine the equilibrium choice of technology.  
 
3.2. Differentiated scale economies 
  From here we depart from the MSV formulation by assuming heterogeneity in the 
technology in the modern sector. Let  () fiand  () cibe functions defined in [0, ] N , both 
continuous in their domain, c a strictly decreasing function, such that  (0) 0 f =  and 
(0) 1 c = . That is, industries are labeled in such a way that, as their index approaches N, 
their marginal product strictly rises from a minimum value of unity. Moreover, let the 








.           ( 8 )  
Condition (8) implies that  ( ) ( ) fi f j > , or fixed costs rise monotonically as i approaches 
N, beginning from a minimum value of zero. The assumptions capture in an intuitive way 
the increasing degree of scale economies denoted by i. As i increases, output must be 
larger in order to realize lower marginal costs in modern production; hence we associate a 
larger i with an increasing industry scale.   
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  The analysis on traditional and modernized outcomes carries over. As with (7), 








.         ( 7 ’ )  
The extent of modernization at equilibrium may therefore only be partial. Let 
[0, ] BN ∈ denote the border industry, such that entry by modern producers is observed in 
industry j,  [0, ] jB ∈ , and entry is not observed in industries i,  (, ] iB N ∈ . B demarcates 
the smaller scale industries (denoted by j) from the larger scale industries (denoted by i). 
We may associate the j industries with “light manufacturing” and the i industries with 
“heavy manufacturing”. As labor endowment rises in a closed economy, we would 
observe a smooth procession into modern production from the smaller scale to the larger 
scale industries. At the extremes, B = N denotes a fully modernized outcome, while B = 0 
denotes a traditional outcome.  
Output in the traditional outcome is the same as in the original MSV formulation. 
However calculation of output under the nontraditional outcome must be modified. Given 
B obtained using (7’), full employment implies 
 
0 [() ()() ] ( )
BN
B f j c j q j dj q i di L ++ = ∫∫        ( 8 )  
Define cumulative functions 
0 () ()
B
FB f jd j = ∫ , 
0 () ()
B
CB cjd j = ∫  for fixed and marginal 
costs, respectively; both cumulative functions are continuous and continuously 
differentiable in [0, ] N . With output symmetric at q, then the nontraditional outcome has 










         ( 9 )   
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 If  () ( 1 () ) LN FN cN >−, fully modernized equilibrium holds. For this special 







=           ( 9 ’ )  
where ( ) T FN F = and ( ) T CN C = .  
 
3.3. The case of trade  
We now turn to the main case, where two economies or regions trade. Regions 
may represent countries or subnational units (urban versus rural). The regions are similar 
in every respect except for their labor endowment, which is our way of capturing 
differences in market size. Label the larger region as North, the smaller region as South; 
to distinguish the two regions (where relevant), an asterisk is used for North.  
Let the two economies be open to interregional trade and migration. Trade must 
be balanced. Labor moves only in response to a difference in real wages between regions. 
Finally, as in the closed economy case, there is an initial period characterized by autarky 
and traditional production; trade (and possible entry by modern producers) occurs only in 
the second period.  
  The case of trade confronts us with a novel situation: there is a potential duopoly 
(rather than merely a potential monopoly) in each industry, i.e. a modern producer from 
each region. We impose additional structure in the case of trade with the following 
assumptions:  
a)  In a duopoly, modern producers behave as Bertrand competitors. 




c)  In an industry where duopolists set the same price, then consumers will 
consume foreign output only after consuming all of domestic output.  
d)  When real wages are identical across regions, and a modern producer is 
expanding its output, it obtains additional workers from the domestic market. 
Domestic workers will move from the modern producer with the lower 
marginal product to the producer with the larger marginal product.  
Assumption a) is based on Mas-Collel, Winston, and Greene (1995) and is a fairly 
common simplification. Assumption c) is highly plausible: it suggests the presence of a 
tiny transport cost, which is negligible whenever prices are discretely different, and 
matters only when prices are identical. Assumption d) implies likewise the presence of 
miniscule frictions in the movement of labor across regions, which matter only when real 
wages are equal. The movement from low to high marginal product industries is 












(A counterpart expression holds in North.) That is, a given wage increase involves 
a smaller profit reduction for the larger scale industry. Hence the larger scale producer is 
able to exert a greater upward pressure on wages. Note that actual wage increases need 
not occur, as workers move even in the absence of discrete wage changes. 
 
3.4. Equilibrium in the case of trade 
The foregoing provides all the conditions needed to derive trade equilibrium, i.e. 
an equilibrium in which exports and imports are positive. In this sub-section the  
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properties (including welfare aspects) of such an equilibrium are described, as well as 
more technical issues such as existence and uniqueness.   
Proposition 1. A trade equilibrium is characterized by the following: 
(i)  Labor supply in each region remains fixed at the original endowment.  
(ii)  There is a border industry B, 0, BN ≤<  such that the set of all industries 
j, jB < , are produced only in South, while the set of all industries i, iB > are 
produced only in North.  
(iii)  Prices in industries i and j as well as wages are set at unity.  
(iv)  Total income equals total spending in both regions and consumption is 
symmetric in output within each region.  
(v)  South is an exporter of the j industries, while North is an exporter of the i 
industries.  
(vi)  The common output q and the border industry B is determined by the 
following condition:  










.        (P1) 
 
The proof of Proposition 1 is simple but rather lengthy and is relegated to the 
Appendix. The proposition describes an equilibrium which conforms to the stylization: 
North and South are engaged in interindustry trade, with (near) complete specialization in 
their respective producing industries. South specializes in and exports smaller scale 
industries, while North specializes in and exports larger scale industries. The demarcation 
between the two types of industries is set by a border industry B. Only border industry B 
has an output that may differ from that given by (P1).    
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Note that the two regions start out with autarky under traditional production, 
hence the equilibrium trade pattern (i.e. the direction of trade, the value of B, and industry 
output) is entirely endogenous to the model. Moreover, even though migration is 
permitted, it never occurs; rather, specialization and output trade replace factor 
movement. One interpretation of this would be to regard the goods market as adjusting 
faster than the labor market.  
A graphical illustration will help fix ideas. Figure 1 plots the industry index on the 
horizontal axis, and industry output on the vertical axis. Producing industries in South are 
read from left to right, with the curve labeled q being the graph of symmetric industry 
output as a function of the number of producing industries. Curve q is decreasing from 
left to right, as fixed labor endowment must be distributed to more and more producing 
industries. Meanwhile a counterpart graph for North is the curve labeled 
* q , with 
producing industries in North read from right to left. The 
* q curve is likewise decreasing 
from right to left. The border industry B is obtained at the intersection of the two curves, 
at which 
* , qq = consistent with (P1).  
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
Based on Figure 1, an intersection of the q-curve and 
* q -curve occurs only once; 
that intersection is possible whenever the left vertical intercept of the q-curve is above 
that of the 
* q -curve. This suggests a result on existence and uniqueness expressed in 
Proposition 2.  
Proposition 2. If a trade equilibrium exists, then it is unique in the following 
sense: the border industry B is unique, and the output of any set of industries with a  
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positive measure is given by (P1). Moreover, a trade equilibrium exists if 
* () TT LL F c >− .  
 
The proof is again left to the Appendix. The foregoing existence condition 
appears mild: it simply requires that the representative industry’s output in a fully 
modernized outcome in North remains smaller than the total output under a traditional 
outcome in South. The number of industries should be sufficiently large, relative to the 
endowment differences between the trading regions.  
Meanwhile, “uniqueness” of equilibrium extends to any positive measure set of 
industries; in particular, the output of industry B is not determinate. From the Appendix, 
it can be shown that industry B may be a monopoly of a North modern producer, or a 
monopoly of a South modern producer, or a duopoly by modern producers supplying the 
same output and pricing at average cost. However the output of a single industry is too 
small to matter significantly for the overall pattern of resource allocation.  
 
3.5. Comparative statics 
   Does an increase in the labor endowment in a region increase the number of 
industries exported by that region? An affirmative answer implies that market size 
determines the scope of specialization across regions. These questions are best answered 
by comparative statics analysis of the effects of changes in L and L
* on equilibrium B.  
Proposition 3. At the equilibrium described in Proposition 1,  0
dB
dL
>  and  * 0
dB
dL
< .  
Proof. Define  
*











.   
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; hence the implicit function theorem holds at a trade 
equilibrium. Therefore there exists a continuously differentiable function
* (, ) BB L L =  in 
the neighborhood of equilibrium, By total differentiation,  
  *
dB B q L
dL L q B q B
∂∂ ∂
==
∂∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂
.  
Given  1( )0 qL C B ∂∂= > , and the derivatives with respect to B (see Appendix), 
then the sign of the foregoing is positive. Furthermore, 





dL L q B q B
∂∂ ∂
== <
∂∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂
. QED 
 
The results of Proposition 2 are highly intuitive. A larger endowment in South 
enables it to produce a wider range of smaller scale industries, while a larger endowment 
in North enables it to produce a wider range of larger scale industries. We can illustrate 
the impact of an increase in L using Figure 2. The increase in L leads to a rightward shift 
in the q curve; likewise the border industry moves to the right as indicated by the arrow. 
A similar figure can represent an increase in
* L  (not drawn), where it is the 
* q that is 
shifted upward, moving the border industry to the left.  
 
3.6. Extensions 
The model can be extended in several directions. We have considered only the 
special case in which all increasing returns production is undertaken even in autarky, 
where only two regions trade, and where demand is symmetric. In particular, introducing  
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many economies and nonhomothetic preferences is a prerequisite to an empirical test of 
the foregoing model.  
Other extensions are of interest in broadening the model’s implications to wider 
concerns of development and organization. First, a dynamic version of the model would 
incorporate a story on capital accumulation and technological change: questions 
regarding industrial formation, dynamic comparative advantage, and growth trajectories 
can be addressed within a framework that emphasizes the role of domestic market size. 
Second, the model should include vertical differentiation of industry, not only to analyze  
agglomeration issues, but also to illuminate issues of industrial organization. For 
example, rural-based manufacturers often act as subcontractors of urban-based firms who 
could have alternatively organized production within a vertically integrated set-up 
(Hayami, 1998). The interplay of organization, geography, and trade form a rich tapestry 
for in-depth research into the dynamics of industrial diffusion. 
 
4. Conclusion 
A pronounced pattern in interindustry manufacturing trade is the specialization of 
developing regions in the lighter industrial goods, and the developed regions in the 
heavier industrial goods. Regions here can be taken as countries or subnational urban and 
rural units. This paper sets out to find an explanation of this pattern.  
The most common explanation applies factor proportions theory. The light-heavy 
dichotomy is interpreted as a distinction between labor-intensive versus capital-intensive 
industries; the developing region is distinguished by its labor-abundance, and the 
developed region by its capital abundance. Factor proportions theory however is  
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empirically wanting; this motivates the search for alternative explanations, particularly in 
in new generation models of trade and economic geography.  
A promising hypothesis from new generation models is the “home market effect”, 
in which large domestic demand imply domestic specialization in the industry subject to 
increasing returns. A major drawback to these models however is their restrictive 
representation of variations in scale economies across industries. Differences in 
technology is limited to the dichotomy between the increasing returns and the constant 
returns sector, with homogenous technology within each sector. Further differentiation of 
technology renders the standard Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition framework 
intractable.  
Instead, this paper proposes an alternative model of increasing returns and 
imperfect competition to address this difficulty. Our model identifies patterns of 
specialization on the basis of domestic market size; light and heavy manufactures are 
distinguished by an intuitive indicator of scale economies, and the light manufactures are 
flexibly characterized as increasing returns industries in their own right. The result is a 
highly tractable model which provides an explanation of the stylized fact.  
  The increasing returns revolution was made possible by the discovery of an 
imperfect competition model distinguished by its simplicity and its consistency with 
major stylized facts. The models that pioneered this breakthrough adopt the monopolistic 
competition framework. While our paper departs from this particular framework, it is 
motivated by precisely the same drive towards explanatory power and simple 




Proof of Proposition 1.  
STEP 1. At a trade equilibrium, industries can be divided into three sets: that is, 
for , , [0, ] ijk B ∈ , let T = {i: such that industry i is a monopoly of a North modern 
producer}, U = {j: such that industry j is a monopoly by a South modern producer}, V = 
{k: industry k is duopoly}.By definition these sets are disjoint. Note that an industry in 
which traditional producers supply output cannot be in equilibrium as autarky 
equilibrium already involves entry by a domestic modern producer. Hence 
[0, ]. TUV N ∪∪=  
Industries i and j, being monopolies, set a limit price of one. Industries k 
meanwhile by Assumption a) set a price closest to marginal cost without incurring losses. 
This entails average cost pricing; at equal prices, then average costs must be equal, which 
implies equal output for both North and South producers. Hence, however industries are 
allocated to sets T, U, and V, prices in both regions are identical. Nominal wages are also 
kept at unity by the presence of a traditional sector. Hence, real wages are also identical 
across regions, such that labor does not migrate. This establishes Property (i).  
  STEP 2. Suppose  [0, ] VN = . Then by Step 1, output in each region must be equal 
in all industries, which is not possible as labor supply at equilibrium is smaller. Hence, T 
and U are non-empty sets. Moreover, industries i and j must set a unit price; under 
symmetric demand (in both regions), then the output of each industry i and j must be 
equal. Let q denote this common output.   
STEP 3. Consider the North modern producer in industry N.  This producer can 
always exceed the output of its South counterpart, because it can draw labor away from  
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smaller scale industries but itself is not subject to labor withdrawal. If so, then its average 
costs can always be lower than that of its competitor, such that the South modern 
producer is absent at equilibrium. Hence,  NT ∈ , and industry N sets a unit price. Note 
that the argument in Step 2 implies that N cannot be the only industry produced in North.  
STEP 4. Suppose there is an industry i and h such that h > i and hT ∉ . Then the 
North modern producer in h can enter and exceed the output of its South competitor by 
drawing labor away from industry i. Hence at equilibrium there can be no such industry 
h. Hence, if we let  inf , BV =  then (, ] BN T ⊂ .  
STEP 5. Suppose there exist  , ' kk V ∈ . Then the same argument as in Step 4 
allows us to rule out  ' kk > ; hence if V is non-empty, it must be a singleton. Furthermore 
appealing to Step 4, B < N. The previous steps imply that [0, ) ,( , ] BU B NT == , for some 
0 < B < N. Thus Property (ii) is established. 
STEP 6. By Step 2, prices of i and j are all unity; moreover, wage remains at unity 
for all industries given the traditional sector. Hence Property (iii) follows. Property (iv) 
meanwhile follows from utility maximization. Property (ii) and (iv) immediately imply 
Property (v). Finally, full employment in each region, as well as equality of output from 
Step 2, lead to (P1).   
 
Proof of Proposition 2: Uniqueness 
To demonstrate uniqueness in the sense of Proposition 2, it is enough to show that 
the output q and value B satisfying (P1) is unique. Differentiating the two terms of (P1) 
yield: 
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== !! , which is differentiable in (0, ) N . Then B is a 













i.e. q !  is strictly decreasing in B. Hence q !  is a one-to-one mapping, such that there is an 
inverse function
1() Bqq
− = !! . Then there is only one value for B for which 
1(1) Bq
− = ! .  
 
Proof of Proposition 2: Existence 
  To demonstrate existence, one needs to show that an allocation described by 
Properties (i) to (vi) is an equilibrium, and that under the condition stated, such an 
allocation exists.    
STEP 1. At an allocation satisfying Properties (i) to (vi), all producers are 
maximizing profit, and all consumers are maximizing utility given prices. Moreover, the 
labor market is in equilibrium. If it can be shown that trade is balanced, then general 
equilibrium is established.  
For South, let () xjand  () mirespectively denote quantity of exports of industry j 
and of imports of industry i. Consumption in each of the j industries in South is given by 
() qx j − , while consumption in North is  ( ) xj; consumption in each of the i industries in 
South is  () mi, while that of North is  () qm i − . Symmetry implies that  () , xj x = for all j 
and ( ) , mi m = for all i. Total exports are therefore Bx, and total imports are ( ) NB m − .  
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By Property (v) of  Proposition 1,  () ( ) B q Bq x N Bm =− + − , or total income equals total 
spending in South. Likewise( ) ( )( ) NB qB x NB qm −= + − − , or total income equals total 
spending in North These imply  () Bx N B m =− , or that trade is balanced.  
STEP 2. To demonstrate existence, it is enough to show that there is a value of B 
such that (P1) is satisfied, for at this allocation, imposing equality of income and 
spending, as well as symmetry of consumption, yields an equilibrium in the foregoing 
sense.  
Consider the maximal value of q ! achieved at  (0) q ! ; under the condition stated in 
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Per capita income and manufacturing export shares of selected countries, 1999 
 
Country GNP,  $US 
(billions)  
Manufacturing 
exports, $US  
(billions) 
Share in total manufacturing 
exports (%) 







      
China 980.2  172.1  51.7  25.0 
Indonesia  119.5  26.2 31.3 26.3 
India 442.2  25.2
  12.4 36.9 
Pakistan   64.0  7.5    5.0  86.7 
Bangladesh   78.0  5.0    2.0   92.0 
      
USA 8,351.0  575.3  86.0  3.1 
Japan 4,078.9  392.7  96.2 1.8 
Germany 2,079.2 452.0  66.6  4.3 
UK 1,338.1  225.0  76.6  4.0 
France 1,427.0  238.8  66.6  5.3 
 




Notes:  1. Export data for Bangladesh and India are 1998 figures, which are the latest   
                available.   
  2. Data for China excludes Hong Kong and Taiwan. 
 
Source of basic data:  
World Trade Organization, International Trade Statistics  
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